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1 A new brand of aggregation theory
It is a commonplace idea that collegial institutions generally make better deci-
sions than those in which a single individual is in charge. This optimistic view,
which can be traced back to French Enlighment social theorists like Rousseau
and Condorcet, permeates todays western judiciary organization, which nor-
mally entrusts collegial courts with the competence to rule on the more complex
cases; think of constitutional courts like the U.S. Supreme Court with its nine
judges. However, the following, by now classic example from legal theory chal-
lenges the orthodoxy. A plainti¤ has brought a civil suit against a defendant,
alleging a breach of contract between them. The court is composed of three
judges A, B and C, who will determine whether or not the defendant must pay
damages to the plainti¤ (d or :d). The case brings up two issues, i.e., whether
the contract was valid or not (v or :v), and whether the defendant was or was
not in breach of it (b and :b). Contract law stipulates that the defendant must
pay damages if, and only if, the contract was valid and the defendant was in
breach of it. Suppose that the judges have the following views of the two issues
and accordingly of the case:
A v :b :d
B :v b :d
C v b d
In order to rule on the case, the court can either directly collect the judges
recommendations on it, or collect the judgesviews of the issues and then solve
the case by applying contract law to these data. If the court uses majority
voting, the former, case-based method delivers :d, whereas the latter, issue-
based method returns rst v and b, and then d. This elegant example is due to
legal theorists Kornhauser and Sager (1993, with a preliminary sketch in 1986).
They describe as a doctrinal paradox any similar occurrence in which the two
methods give conicting answers. What makes the discrepancy paradoxical is
that each method is commendable on some ground, i.e., the former respects the
judgesnal views, while the latter provides the court with a rationale, so one
would wish them always to be compatible. The legal literature has not come up
with a clear-cut solution, although the issue-based method often attracts more
sympathy. This persisting di¢ culty casts doubt on the belief that collegial
courts would be wiser than individual ones. Clearly, with a single judge, the two
methods coincide unproblematically.
An entire body of work, now referred to as judgment aggregation theory, has
grown out of Kornhauser and Sagers doctrinal paradox. As an intermediate
step, their problem was rephrased by political philosopher Pettit (2001), who
wanted to make it both more widely applicable and more analytically tractable.
What he calls the discursive dilemma is, rst of all, the generalized version of
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the doctrinal paradox in which a group, whatever it is, can base its decision
on either the conclusion-based or the premiss-based method, whatever the sub-
stance of conclusions and premisses. Any time the propositions of interest to
the group can logically be divided into a set of premisses and a conclusion, the
representative of the group can put to the vote either the conclusion directly or
the premisses themselves, while performing the required inference in the latter
case. What the court example illustrates can apply equally well to a political
assembly, an expert committee, and many deliberating groups; as one of the
promoters of the concept of deliberative democracy, Pettit would speculatively
add political society as a whole. Second, and more technically, the discursive
dilemma shiftes the stress away from the conict of two methods of decision
to the logical contradiction within the total set of propositions that the group
accepts. In the previous example, with d  ! v ^ b representing contract law,
the contradictory set is
fv; b; d ! v ^ b;:dg .
This shift has far-reaching consequences since all propositions are now being
treated alike; indeed, the very distinction between premisses and conclusion
vanishes. If one is concerned with developing a general theory, this move has
clear advantages. Given a set of propositions, it may be tricky to divide it
appropriately, and thus to say what the two methods exactly are. It is denitely
simpler, and it may be su¢ cient, to pay attention to whole sets of propositions
accepted by either the individuals or the group, more briey judgment sets, and
inquire how these relate to each other. The question raised by the discursive
dilemma is why and when individual judgment sets that are consistent deliver
a collective judgment set that is inconsistent. This is already the problem of
judgment aggregation.
In a further step, List and Pettit (2002) introduced an aggregation mapping
F , which takes proles of individual judgment sets (A1; :::; An) to collective
judgment sets A, and subject F to formal conditions which they demonstrate
are logically incompatible. Both the proposed formalism and impossibility con-
clusion are in the vein of social choice theory, but they are directed at the
discursive dilemma, which the latter theory cannot handle in its own terms,
since there is no question here of preferences and related social-choice-theoretic
concepts. At this stage, judgment aggregation theory exists in full, having de-
ned its object of study - the F mapping, or collective judgment function - as
well as its method of analysis - it consists in dening axiomatic conditions on
F and investigating when these conditions result into impossibilities, or to the
contrary, support well-behaved rules, such as simple majority voting, the only
rule considered in the above example.
List and Pettits impossibility theorem was shortly superseded by others
of growing sophistication, due to Pauly and van Hees (2006), Dietrich (2006),
Dietrich and List (2007a), Mongin (2008), Nehring and Puppe (2008, 2010),
Dokow and Holzman (2009, 2010a and b), Dietrich and Mongin (2010a). This
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lengthy, but still incomplete list, should be complemented by two papers that
contributed di¤erently to the progress of the eld. Renewing the investigation
of social choice rules, Nehring and Puppe (2002) characterized, in the sense of
necessary and su¢ cient conditions, those preference domains for which relevant
sets of axioms - strategy-proofness among them - entail dictatorship. Judgment
aggregation theory has taken up this concern for characterizing impossibility
domains. It does so by dening the agenda of propositions on which the indi-
viduals and the collective make judgments, and then by asking which properties
of the agenda turn any F satisfying certain axioms into a dictatorship (or some
other unpalatable rules like oligarchy). On a very di¤erent score, Dietrich (2007)
showed that the logical formalism of judgment aggregation theory could be de-
ployed without making reference to any specic logical calculus. Only a few
elementary properties of the formal language and of the logic need assuming
for the theorems to carry through. The so-called general logic states these req-
uisites (see Dietrich and Mongin, 2010a, for an up-to-date version). The rst
papers were unnecessarily restrictive in relying on the elementary propositional
calculus alone.
Implicit in the previous comments is the view that judgment aggregation
theory is a brand of logical theory. This view ts the work of many judgment
aggregation theorists very well, but not so well the work of Nehring and Puppe
(whose contributions often use the framework of social choice theory) or the
work of Dokow and Holzman (who have devised a combinatorial framework of
their own, drawing inspiration from Rubinstein and Fishburn, 1986). The more
thorough review by Mongin (2012) elaborates on this di¤erence in perspectives
while defending the use of logic (for an earlier French version, see Dietrich and
Mongin, 2010b). This review also points out the historical origin of judgment
aggregation theory, arguably already understood as a logical theory, in Guilbaud
(1952) and Condorcet himself, whose rediscovery in the mid-20th century was
largely due to Guilbaud.
Consistently with this orientation towards logic, section 2 introduces a syn-
tactical framework for the F function and states in this framework the axiomatic
conditions on F that have attracted most attention. The crucial issue of agen-
das arises in section 3, which characterizes those which, for given conditions
on F , turn this function into a dictatorship (oligarchy will not be discussed
here). Essentially, there is a single theorem, but in three forms, each of which
is instructive in itself. This theorem is the central achievement of judgment
aggregation theory by common consent, so one can take it to represent, at least
in very broad outlook, the present of that theory. Section 4 tentatively argues
about its future, a challenging and unavoidably questionable exercise. It seems
as if the years of high theorizing are over by now, and in the recent years,
judgment aggregation theory has indeed moved forward mostly on the front of
applications. In our view, this applied work delineates the near future of the
theory, and we accordingly restrict attention to it in the prospective part of this
chapter.
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The rst applications of judgment aggregation theory were to social choice
theory. Having been a heuristic source for the framework and conditions on F ,
this eld was also a convenient source of corollaries to the main theorems. It
is su¢ cient to replace the abstract propositional symbols p, q, r... by formulas
such as xRy, zPw, uIv, with the usual preference interpretations, to give rise
to a tentative application. Whether a proper social choice corollary follows will
depend in particular on whether the agenda conditions stated in the judgment
aggregation theorems hold for the new set of formulas, given the logical con-
nections between these formulas (reecting transitivity, completeness, acyclicity,
and the like). Arrows theorem can be recovered in this way, along with variants
that either already existed or are new to social choice theory. The second and
actually larger group of applications has emerged at the crossroads of formal
epistemology and theoretical computer science. Among others, it is concerned
with relaxing those judgment aggregation conditions which are responsible for
dictatorship. This has led to the ourishing "belief merging literature", which
often adopts a syntactical form and often pays attention to computational is-
sues, as bet its computer science connections. For this fairly large body of
work, we refer to Grossi and Pigozzi (2014) and Pigozzi (2016). The present,
purposefully short discussion deals with a third group of applications, concern-
ing law and economics, which have not yet been explored. Given that judgment
aggregation theory originates in a law and economics example, it is but natural
to inquire what it can contribute to this eld in return. Section 4 is entirely de-
voted to these applications, which will be seen to be mostly prospective, rather
than already existing.
2 A logical framework for judgment aggregation
theory
By denition, a language L for judgment aggregation theory is any set of formu-
las '; ; ; : : : that is constructed from a set of logical symbols S containing :,
the Boolean negation symbol, and that is closed for this symbol (i.e., if ' 2 L,
then :' 2 L). Normally, S contains symbols for other Boolean connectives
(conjunction ^, disjunction _, implication!, biimplication !) and in princi-
ple, it may contain modal operators (such as  interpreted as "it is obligatory
that", Bi interpreted as "individual i believes that", or =) interpreted as a
non-Boolean conditional). Then, these added symbols will have to satisfy the
relevant closure properties. A logic for judgment aggregation theory is any set
of axioms and rules that regulates the inference relation ` on L and associated
technical notions - logical truth and contradiction, consistent and inconsistent
sets - while satisfying the general logic. Informally, the latter stipulates that
` be monotonic and compact, and that any consistent set of formulas can be
extended to a complete consistent set (S  L is complete if, for all ' 2 L, either
' 2 S or :' 2 S). Monotonicity means that inductive logics are excluded, and
compactness (which is needed only in specic proofs) that some deductive logics
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are. The extendability requisite is standard for deductive logics.
Among the many calculi that enter this framework, propositional examples
stand out, but they can be richer than the elementary propositional calculus
with Boolean connectors alone. Adding modal operators, one gets the many
calculi of deontic, epistemic and conditional logics. Although this may not be
so obvious, rst-order calculi with quantiers are also permitted.
In L, a subset X is xed to represent the propositions that are in question
for the group; this is the agenda, which is the focus of attention in judgment
aggregation theory. In all generality, X needs only to be non-empty with at least
one contingent formula (not a logical truth or contradiction), and to be closed
for negation. The court example, in the discursive dilemma version, involves
the agenda
X = fv; b; d; d$ v ^ b;:v;:b;:d;:(d$ v ^ b)g.
The theory represents judgments by subsets B  X that are initially unre-
stricted. These judgment sets will be denoted by Ai; A0i; ::: for the individuals
i = 1; :::n, and A;A0; : : : for the collective. A formula ' represents a proposi-
tion, in the sense of a semantic object endowed with a truth value, and it also
serves to capture the associated judgment, in the sense of a cognitive operation,
thanks to the informal translation:
(R) individual i (the collective) makes the judgment ' i¤ ' belongs
to the judgment set Ai (resp. A).
Judgment sets can be subjected to various logical properties. Here we consider
only two sets of judgment sets, i.e., the unrestricted set 2X and the set D of
consistent and complete judgment sets (with completeness being relative to X,
not L). The theory has also investigated the intermediate case of consistent,
but not necessarily complete judgment sets. Thus far, it has not been able to
relax consistency (see Dietrich and List, 2008).
The last formal concept is the collective judgment function F , which as-
sociates a collective judgment set to each prole of judgment sets for the n
individuals:
A = F (A1; : : : ; An):
We restrict attention to F : Dn ! 2X and F : Dn ! D. Taking D to be the
range means that the collective sets obey the same stringent logical constraints
as the individual ones. This framework is su¢ cient to capture simple majority
voting, as in the court example, and various generalizations. Formally, dene
formula-wise majority voting as Fmaj : Dn ! 2X such that, for every prole
(A1; : : : ; An) 2 Dn,
Fmaj(A1; :::; An) = f' 2 X : jfi : ' 2 Aigj  qg,
with q = n+12 if n is odd and q =
n
2 + 1 if n is even.
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Here, the range is not D because there can be unbroken ties, and so incomplete
collective judgment sets, when n is even. More strikingly, for many agendas,
the range is not D also when n is odd, because there are inconsistent collective
judgment sets, as the court example illustrates. By varying the value of q
between 1 and n in the denition, one gets specic quota rules F qmaj . One
would expect inconsistency to occur with low q, and incompleteness with large
q. Nehring and Puppe (2002, 2008) and Dietrich and List (2007b) investigate
these rules in detail.
Having dened and exemplied F functions, we introduce some axiomatic
properties they may satisfy.
Systematicity. For all formulas '; 2 X and all proles (A1; : : : ; An),
(A01; : : : ; A
0
n), if ' 2 Ai ,  2 A0i for every i = 1; : : : ; n, then
' 2 F (A1; : : : ; An),  2 F (A01; : : : ; A0n).
Independence. For every formula ' 2 X and all proles (A1; : : : ; An),
(A01; : : : ; A
0
n), if ' 2 Ai , ' 2 A0i for every i = 1; : : : ; n, then
' 2 F (A1; : : : ; An), ' 2 F (A01; : : : ; A0n):
Monotonicity. For every formula ' 2 X and all proles (A1; : : : ; An),
(A01; : : : ; A
0
n), if ' 2 Ai ) ' 2 A0i for every i = 1; : : : ; n, with ' =2 Aj and
' 2 A0j for at least one j, then
' 2 F (A1; : : : ; An)) ' 2 F (A01; : : : ; A0n):
Unanimity preservation. For every formula ' 2 X and every prole
(A1; : : : ; An), if ' 2 Ai for every i = 1; : : : ; n, then ' 2 F (A1; : : : ; An).
By denition, F is a dictatorship if there is a j such that, for every prole
(A1; : : : ; An),
F (A1; : : : ; An) = Aj .
There can only be one such j, to be called the dictator. The last property is
Non-dictatorship. F is not a dictatorship
It is routine to check that Fmaj satises all the list. Unanimity preservation
and Non-dictatorship are self-explanatory. Systematicity means that the group,
when faced with a prole of individual judgment sets, gives the same answer
concerning a formula ' as it would give concerning a possibly di¤erent formula
 , when faced with a possibly di¤erent prole, supposing that the individual
judgments concerning ' in the rst prole are the same as those concerning
 in the second prole. Independence amounts to restricting this requirement
to ' =  . Thus, it eliminates one claim made by Systematicity - i.e., that the
identity of the formula does not matter - while preserving another - i.e., that the
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collective judgment of ' depends only on individual judgments of '. Monotonic-
ity requires that, when a collective result favours a subgroups judgment, this
still holds if more individuals join the subgroup.
Systematicity, Independence and Monotonicity are clearly reminiscent of
neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and positive responsiveness in
social choice theory. Each can be defended by normative arguments that have
already surfaced there, i.e., systematicity by the fact that many voting rules sat-
isfy it, independence by its non-manipulability property, and monotonicity by
its democratic responsiveness implication. The argument for Unanimity preser-
vation follows the existing one for the Pareto principle, while Non-dictatorship
is regarded as unpalatable, exactly as in social choice theory.
Systematicity was the condition underlying List and Pettits (2002) impos-
sibility theorem, but henceforth, the focus of attention shifted to Independence.
The problem that has gradually raised to the fore is to characterize i.e., nd
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the agendasX such that no F : Dn ! D
satises Non-dictatorship, Independence, and Unanimity preservation. There is
a variation of this problem with Monotonicity as a further condition, and another
variation that involves drawing a distinction between premisses and conclusions
within the agenda X. The next section sketches the respective answers.
3 The present of the theory: a characterization
theorem in three forms
The promised answers depend on further technical notions. First, a set of for-
mulas S  L is called minimally inconsistent if it is inconsistent and all its
proper subsets are consistent. With the elementary propositional calculus used
for the court example, this is the case for
fv; b; d$ v ^ b;:dg,
but not for
f:v;:b; d$ v ^ b; dg.
Second, for '; 2 X, it is said that ' conditionally entails  denoted by
' `   if ' 6= : and there is some minimally inconsistent Y  X with
';: 2 Y . This is equivalent to requiring that f'g [ Y 0 `  hold for some
minimal auxiliary set of premisses Y 0 that is contradictory neither with ', nor
with : .
Now, an agenda X is said to be path-connected (or totally blocked) if, for
every pair of formulas '; 2 X, there are formulas '1; : : : ; 'k 2 X such that
' = '1 ` '2 ` : : : ` 'k =  .
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Loosely speaking, agendas with this property have many, possibly roundabout
logical connections. Finite agendas can be represented by directed graphs: the
formulas '; are the nodes and there is an arrow pointing from ' to  for each
conditional entailment ' `  . It easy to check that the court agenda X is
path-connected.
Now, we are in a position to state a rst answer to the characterization
problem (Dokow and Holzman, 2010a; Nehring and Puppe, 2010a; this result
originates in Nehring and Puppe, 2002). From now we assume that n  2.
Theorem (rst form). If X is path-connected, then no F : Dn ! D satis-
es Non-dictatorship, Unanimity preservation, Monotonicity and Independence.
The agenda condition is also necessary for this conclusion.
The su¢ ciency part of this result generalizes the court example in the fol-
lowing sense. The prole of this example shows that, given the agenda X, Fmaj
does not have range D. This can be derived abstractly from the su¢ ciency
part by noting that Fmaj satises the four axiomatic condition and X is path-
connected, so that the range condition must fail. The necessity part delivers the
signicant information that, even keeping Fmaj , the discursive dilemma cannot
occur if X is not path-connected.
As it turns out, Monotonicity can be dropped from the list of axioms if the
agenda is required to satisfy a further condition. Let us say that X is even-
number negatable if there is a minimally inconsistent set of formulas Y  X
and there are distinct '; 2 Y such that Y:f'; g is consistent, where the
set Y:f'; gis obtained from Y by replacing '; by :';: and keeping the
other formulas unchanged. This seemingly opaque condition is in fact not very
demanding, and for instance X satises it. To see that, take
Y = fv; b; d;:(d$ v ^ b)g and ' = v;  = b.
The next result was proved by Dokow and Holzman (2010a). In showing how
Arrows theorem, in one version, can be recovered by judgment aggregation
theory, Dietrich and List (2007a) indirectly proved the su¢ ciency part.
Theorem (second form). If X is path-connected and even-number negat-
able, then no F : Dn ! D satises Non-dictatorship, Unanimity preservation,
and Independence. If n  3, the agenda conditions are also necessary for this
conclusion.
This is often referred to as the "canonical theorem" of judgment aggregation.
However, a further step of generalization is available. Unlike the work reviewed
so far, it is motivated by the court example in the doctrinal paradox version, as
against its discursive dilemma restatement. It is specially devised to clarify the
premiss-based method, which is often proposed as a solution to this paradox.
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Formally, we dene the set of premisses to be a subset P  X, requiring only
that it be non-empty and closed for negation, and we reconsider the framework
to account for the di¤erence between P and its complement X n P . Adapting
the existing conditions, we dene
Independence on premisses: same statement as for Independence, but
holding only for every p 2 P .
Non-dictatorship for premisses: there is no j 2 f1; : : : ; ng such that
F (A1; : : : ; An) \ P = Aj \ P for every (A1; : : : ; An) 2 Dn.
Similarly revising the agenda conditions, we say that X is path-connected
in P if the denition of path-connectedness holds for formulas '; ; '1; : : : ; 'k
that are all in P , and say that X is even-number negatable in P if the denition
of even-number negatable holds with the negatable pair '; being in P . These
new conditions can be illustrated in terms of the agenda X after xing a natural
interpretation for the set of premisses:
P = fv; b; d$ v ^ b;:v;:b;:(d$ v ^ b)g
As is easy to check, X is both path-connected and even-number negatable in P .
We can now state the last result (Dietrich and Mongin, 2010a).
Theorem (third form). If X is path-connected and even-number negat-
able in P , there is no F : Dn ! D that satises Non-dictatorship on premisses,
Independence on premisses and Unanimity preservation. If n  3, the agenda
conditions are also necessary for this conclusion.
This third form of the theorem is more assertive than the second one (take
P = X, a permitted case). Another relevant specication occurs by taking
X n P to be a set of conclusions deducible from P according to the underlying
logic. This specication does not make the results any more precise, but it helps
connect the theory with those applications - like the doctrinal paradox - in which
a logical distinction holds between premisses and conclusions; more on this line
below. Having explored our sample theorem in various ways, we now move to
the evaluative and prospective part of this chapter.
4 Law and economics and some future direc-
tions for the theory
Since judgment aggregation theory was motivated by the doctrinal paradox, a
law and economics example, it is only natural to investigate its contribution,
both current and potential, to that eld. As we will show, the current contribu-
tion is modest, but various hints suggest a potential. Starting from Kornhauser
and Sagers groundbreaking discussion, legal theorists have inquired about the
prevalence of the doctrinal paradox in the actual working of U.S. collegiate
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courts, and usually concluded that the paradox, or related forms of conict
between the issue- and case-based methods, occurred rarely. Kornhauser and
Sager (1993) found examples in the U.S. Supreme Court record, but striking
as they are, they are small in number and even debatable as such (see Post
and Salop, 1991-1992, and Nash, 2003, for a critical review). A major defect of
these empirical investigations, they do not distinguish su¢ ciently between the
low prevalence of the paradox and the fact that it is di¢ cult to recognize. U.S.
collegiate courts do not always state in their nal judgments what the judges
individual positions are, and this even holds for the Supreme Court, which is
more profuse than any other collegiate court when it comes to making individual
positions known.
In view of these uncertainties, an obviously useful preliminary would be to
investigate the combinatorics of the doctrinal paradox or related forms of con-
ict. On the court agenda dened above, granting that the formula d ! v ^ b
is unanimously agreed, the combinatorics reduces to the simple task of counting
how many proles of judgments on b, d, v give rise to a conict between the
two methods when majority voting applies. It is easy to see that Kornhauser
and Sager have exactly recognized which set of proles precipates the conict
and this set has a relatively low probability ratio (our computation based on
standard independence and uniformity assumptions leads to a ratio of 3/32).
Less trivially, one could let the court agendas vary, and for instance, count how
many agendas are path-connected among all those which can be formulated in
the propositional language based on the three propositional variables b, d, v.
More abstract combinatorial investigations could be performed in connection
with the theoretical results of last section, and they might deliver useful infor-
mation for the legal theorists, over and beyond what can be said on the doctrinal
paradox itself.
Whatever its mathematical and empirical prevalence, the doctrinal paradox
serves the didactic purpose of pointing out two plausible adjudication meth-
ods that collective courts can employ, and the law and economics literature
has actually spent more time on comparing these methods in general than on
the paradox itself. While Kornhauser and Sager (1993) and Kornhauser (2008)
express context-sensitive preferences between the two methods, Rogers (1996)
supports the case-based method unreservedly, and Post and Salop (1992) sup-
port the issue-based method unreservedly. The arguments displayed in this
controversy are far from being tight. They tend to entangle formal questions,
e.g., which method is more likely to deliver a well-dened solution or more likely
to resist strategic manipulation, with substantial legal questions, e.g., whether
one method is more likely to protect the defendant in a criminal trial. They
also tend to entangle static properties, such as the properties just said, with
dynamic properties, such as the ability to dene law by precedents, over and
beyond the resolution of a particular case. Some writers go as far as to attribute
the doctrinal paradox to one of the two methods, whereas the other is obviously
co-responsible for it. All in all, despite some analytic e¤orts like Nashs (2003),
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much remains to be done in order to produce a decent list of normative consid-
erations and weigh them against each other to decide between the two methods.
Some formalism would help bring order, but legal theorists do not use any or
provide sketches that fall below the mark.
They can be excused by the fact that judgment aggregation theorists have
not su¢ ciently addressed their concerns. We have emphasized from the start
that the doctrinal paradox was not the discursive dilemma, and that these
theorists have taken the latter, not the former, to be the starting point of
their formal investigations. The tendency in their eld is to play down the
signicance of the distinction; this shows in some blurred accounts that motivate
the theorems, and in such strange expressions as "the discursive paradox". But
legal theorists have little use for the discursive dilemma and its elaboration; what
they are really concerned with is the doctrinal paradox and the accompanying
comparison of methods to adjudicate legal claims. This explains Dietrich and
Mongins (2010a) unconventional move of distinguishing between premisses and
conclusions in their theorem statement. With this logical distinction, they make
a step towards formalizing the legal distinction between issues and case. Clearly,
the latter presupposes the former, although it goes beyond it semantically. This
limited step makes it possible already to draw some lessons from judgment
aggregation theory for the legal theorists (see also Mongin, 2008) .
One lesson concerns the highly generalized form of the doctrinal paradox this
theorem delivers. It does not mention simple majority voting, which is the only
decision rule considered by legal theorists, but abstract conditions that other
rules can also obey; in this way, the theorem makes the paradox more acute
than the legal theorists have conceived of it. Among these abstract conditions,
Unanimity preservation stands apart in the theorem, because it is the only one
that applies both to premisses and conclusions; for example, Independence is
here restricted to premisses. Heuristically, the source of the impossibility lies in
the fact that, when a prole exhibits unanimous endorsement of some conclusion,
the collective concurs; this connects the impossibility with the classic problem
of "spurious unanimity" in the case of collective preference under uncertainty
(Mongin, 1997-2016). The implication for the legal theorists is that judges
cannot at the same time apply majority voting on the issues and record their
unanimous agreement on the case when this occurs. In other words, the issue-
based method already clashes with a very weak form of the case-based method.
Since such a limited addition may be di¢ cult to avoid in practice, one may
think that the issue-based method is not as safe as it has often been suggested.
Another lesson of interest, which is this time shared by judgment aggrega-
tion theory as a whole, is that the agenda plays an essential part in the origin of
impossibilities. As the "canonical theorem" and its variants exactly characterize
the troublesome agendas, they o¤er both an explanation of the impossibilities
(through the su¢ cient conditions) and a way of avoiding them (through the nec-
essary conditions). A quick implication for legal theorists is that courts could do
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away with some occurrences of the impossibilities by restructuring their agenda.
Experimenting with toy examples suggests that slight changes might be su¢ -
cient. However, when they come to practical solutions, legal theorists consider ex
post revisions of individual opinions rather than this attractive ex ante solution
(see the examples of Supreme Court justices reversing their opinions in Korn-
hauser and Sagers, 1993, and Post and Salop, 1991-1993). To pursue this point
appropriately, careful attention must be payed to the logical status of the legal
doctrine (contract law in the court example of the doctrinal paradox). Does it
belong to the agenda? If it does, should it also be subjected to a vote if the
issue-based method is adopted? And what is the most suitable logic to capture
its role in the judgesreasoning? More specically, is elementary propositional
logic su¢ cient, as in the usual restatement of the court example, or should one
rather resort to some more sophisticated logic, say deontic or conditional logic?
These are open questions, with some hints of answers in Mongin (2012) following
technical advances by Dietrich (2010). Interestingly, some legal theorists - e.g.,
Landa and Lax (2009) - appear to have foreshadowed some of these apparently
abstruse questions. Here is another subarea in which law and economics and
judgment aggregation theory could fruitfully join forces.
5 References
Dietrich, F. (2006), "Judgment Aggregation: (Im)Possibility Theorems", Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 126: 286-298.
Dietrich, F. (2007), "A Generalized Model of Judgment Aggregation", Social
Choice and Welfare 28: 529-565.
Dietrich, F. (2010), "The Possibility of Judgment Aggregation on Agendas
with Subjunctive Implications", Journal of Economic Theory 145: 603-638.
Dietrich, F. and C. List (2007a), "Arrows Theorem in Judgment Aggrega-
tion", Social Choice and Welfare 29: 19-33.
Dietrich, F. and C. List (2007b), "Judgment Aggregation by Quota Rules:
Majority Voting Generalized", Journal of Theoretical Politics 19: 391-424.
Dietrich, F. and C. List (2008), "Judgment Aggregation Without Full Ra-
tionality", Social Choice and Welfare 31: 15-39.
Dietrich, F. and P. Mongin (2010a), "The Premiss-Based Approach to Judg-
ment Aggregation", Journal of Economic Theory 145: 562-582.
Dietrich, F. and P. Mongin (2010b), "Un bilan interprétatif de la théorie de
lagrégation logique", Revue déconomie politique, 120, p. 929-972.
Dokow, E. and R. Holzman (2009), "Aggregation of Binary Evaluations for
Truth-Functional Agendas", Social Choice and Welfare 32: 221-241.
Dokow, E. and R. Holzman (2010a), "Aggregation of Binary Evaluations",
Journal of Economic Theory 145: 495-511.
Dokow, E. and R. Holzman (2010b), "Aggregation of Binary Evaluations
with Abstentions", Journal of Economic Theory 145: 544-561.
13
Grossi, D. and G. Piggozzi (2014), Judgment Aggregation: A Primer, San
Rafael, CA: Morgan & Claypool.
Guilbaud, G.T. (1952), "Les théories de lintérêt général et le problème
logique de lagrégation", Économie appliquée, 5, p. 501-584. Reprinted in Revue
économique, 63 (2012): 659-720.
Kornhauser, L.A. (2008), "Aggregate Rationality in Adjudication and Leg-
islation", Politics, Philosophy, Economics 7: 5-27.
Kornhauser, L.A. and L.G. Sager (1986), "Unpacking the Court", Yale Law
Journal 96: 82-117.
Kornhauser, L.A. and L.G. Sager (1993), "The One and the Many: Adjudi-
cation in Collegial Courts", California Law Review 81: 1-59.
Landa, D. and J.R. Lax (2009), "Legal Doctrine on Collegial Courts", Jour-
nal of Politics 71: 946-963.
List, C. and P. Pettit (2002), "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossi-
bility Result", Economics and Philosophy 18: 89-110.
Mongin, P. (1997), "Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle", Thema
Working Paper, Université of Cergy-Pontoise (published in Economics and Phi-
losophy 32 (2016): 511-532).
Mongin, P. (2008), "Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation",
Journal of Economic Theory 141: 100-113.
Mongin, P. (2012), "The Doctrinal Paradox, the Discursive Dilemma, and
Logical Aggregation Theory", Theory and Decision, 73: 315-345.
Nash, J.R. (2003), "A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Mul-
timembers Courts", Stanford Law Review 56: 75-159.
Nehring, K. and C. Puppe (2002), "Strategy-Proof Social Choice on Single-
Peaked Domains: Possibility, Impossibility and the Space Between", WP of the
Dept of Economics, University of California, Davies.
Nehring, K. and C. Puppe (2008), "Consistent Judgement Aggregation: The
Truth-Functional Case", Social Choice and Welfare 31: 41-57.
Nehring, K. and C. Puppe (2010), "Abstract Arrowian Aggregation", Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 145: 467-494.
Pauly, M. and M. van Hees (2006), "Logical Constraints on Judgment Ag-
gregation", Journal of Philosophical Logic 35: 569-585.
Pettit, P. (2001), "Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma",
Philosophical Issues 11: 268-299.
Pigozzi, G. (2017), "Belief Merging and Judgment Aggregation", The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.),
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/belief-merging/>.
Post, D. and S.C. Salop (1991-1992), "Rowing Against the Tidewater. A
Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels", Georgetown Law Journal : 80, 743-
774.
Rogers, J.M. (1996), ""Issue-Voting" by Multi-member Appellate Courts
A Response to Some Radical Proposals", Vanderbilt Law Review : 49 . 997-1044.
Rubinstein, A. and P.J Fishburn (1986), "Algebraic Aggregation Theory",
Journal of Economic Theory : 38, 63-77.
14
